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Martin Hübner, Emer de Vattel and Ferdinando Galiani acted as political 
functionaries on behalf of three of Europe’s lesser powers during the second half of 
the eighteenth century. They considered the deplorable condition of the interstate 
system through different historical outlooks on the legal customs of international 
trade. Consequently, they suggested different problems to lie at the core of 
eighteenth-century global conflict and proposed different natural law theories as 
ways to capture and remedy the essential moral and political tensions between war 
and trade. Underlying their legal ideas on the neutrality of trade in wartime and the 
containment of military conflict Hübner, Vattel and Galiani deployed rival visions of 
the future of the European state system and its economic functioning on a global 
scale. This article outlines their respective views on the subject of the neutrality 
of trade against the backgrounds of their general political thought, eighteenth-
century international relations and the wider development of the political treatment 
of principles of universal morality between the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War 
and the end of the War of the American Independence. 
1 This article is based on a paper that was prepared during the summer of 2006, when I was a 
fellow of the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies. I benefited from comments made by the other 
participants of the conference on ‘Universalism in International Law and Political Philosophy’ of 3–5 
August 2006, in Helsinki, organised by the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies and The Erik 
Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights.
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Universalism and the Neutrality of Trade
During the second half of the eighteenth century, international trade suffered from 
the violent consequences of the assimilation of commerce into the Anglo-French 
struggle for global hegemony. When commerce assumed this new political status 
the antonymous relations between trade and war, and wealth and power, also moved 
to the centre of legal debate where they presented a major challenge and inspired 
natural law thinkers to develop their views into a new direction. It was generally 
recognised that in modern Europe, the rise of international commerce had increased 
living standards and connected people living in different states to each other by 
means of markets. Yet, at the same time, one also generally realised that these 
new relations between nations were historically constructed in such a way that they 
created a tense political situation in which conflict between states always threatened 
to lead to a degeneration of international commercial society into a state of war.2 
While European states were embroiled in this new kind of struggle for hegemony, 
a number of political thinkers devised schemes to limit the belligerent excesses that 
accompanied this development. Applying the discourse of natural law to the eighteenth-
century practice of international politics, these writers employed different ideas of 
universal morality, justice and exchange to build their models of international stability. 
In this article some of the views of three of these authors, Martin Hübner (1723–1795), 
Emer de Vattel (1714–1767) and Ferdinando Galiani (1728–1787), on the subject of 
neutrality and trade are compared against the backgrounds of their general political 
thought, eighteenth-century international relations and the wider development of the 
political treatment of principles of universal morality between the outbreak of the 
Seven Years’ War and the end of the War of the American Independence.
There are a number of grounds for comparing these authors – while other 
eighteenth-century figures could easily have been included as well, as the 
discussion about neutrality and trade extended through the whole of Europe and 
had a great many subtle and original writers contributors coming from different 
national contexts. Hübner, Vattel and Galiani all were political functionaries, acting 
on behalf of three of Europe’s lesser powers. They all used natural law as a tool to 
approach the deplorable condition of the eighteenth-century state system, which 
they played out at the level of ideas about neutrality and trade. Furthermore, they 
all put forward – longer or shorter – histories of natural law thinking and were highly 
critical of earlier views: all of them suggested that ideas of natural law had to be 
radically modified to avoid the problems that the eighteenth-century Westphalia 
treaty based state-system ran into and that seemed impossible to put to rest. Most 
importantly, underlying their respective visions of reformed natural law thinking and 
2 These conditions and the different ways in which eighteenth-century writers responded to the 
problem of ‘Jealousy of Trade’ are discussed in Hont 2005.
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political practice Hübner, Vattel and Galiani deployed rival visions of the future of 
the European state system and its economic functioning on a global scale. These 
views, that remain to be reconstructed as a much larger project than is the scope 
of this article, underpinned their legal ideas on the neutrality of trade in war and the 
containment of military conflict. As such, these ideas on how to protect the neutrality 
of trade in wartime represented, as I argue, the first step to the development of a 
new reformed inter-state system.
Therefore, the aim of this article is not so much to compare the ideas of 
three thinkers on human nature to see how universalism could be asserted and 
be denied in the middle of the eighteenth century (i.e. modernity), but rather to 
explore how universalist ideas served in different ways to assist in overcoming 
the painful predicament of modern economic and political competition leading to 
all-out global warfare.
Martin Hübner: The Underdeveloped Law 
of Nature in the International Sphere
The first-ever theoretical work devoted to the rights of neutral states to maritime 
trade was published by Martin Hübner, a hitherto understudied Danish political 
writer, who was intellectually well-connected and influential at court.3 Hübner 
dedicated his earlier works to Johann Hartwig Ernst Graf von Bernstorff – one of 
the architects of Danish foreign policy, who is not to be confused with any of the 
later members of the Bernstorff diplomatic dynasty, which put a great mark on 
Danish foreign policy in the second half of the eighteenth century.
Hübner had a curious relation with England, where he was assesseur of the Royal 
Society. One of the first works with his name on the cover (at least on its second 
edition)4 was entitled: Le politique danois, ou, L’ambition des Anglais démasquée 
par leurs pirateries: ouvrage dans lequel on recherche laquelle des deux nations de 
la France ou de l’Angleterre, a dérangé par ses hostilités l’harmonie de l’Europe, 
& où l’on prouve aux Souverains de quelle importance il est pour eux d’abattre 
l’orgueil de ce people. The work, which was first published in 1756 in Copenhagen 
(according to the title page),5 was an outright attack on English foreign policy, which 
the author saw through the lens of its maritime strategies that he associated with 
piracy: “It is not easy to get rid of the idea, of which one has been convinced for 
3 The Kongelige Bibliothek at Copenhagen owns a fair number of unpublished manuscripts and 
letters by Hübner, some of which discuss commercial and financial topics. 
4 Hübner’s authorship of this work was questioned by some contemporaries, see below.




sixty years now, that France wants to instate a universal monarchy. But France has 
looked at her neighbours with great envy for so long now, that one can see now 
that it is the English who try to persuade others that France has ambitions greater 
than they can be.”6 The threat of universal monarchy came from England, not from 
France. The author compared the English to Roman rhetoricians who twisted the 
truth and considered their capacity to do so a mark of virtue. While they accused the 
French of aspiring to universal monarchy, the English themselves violated the laws 
they tried to impose on the behaviour of the French. Moreover, this behaviour did 
not remain restricted to the violation of any laws of nature that might be supposed, 
but extended itself to the violation of signed treaties, which was the reason for the 
outbreak of the Seven Years’ War. The author of the Politique danois justified that 
Danish politicians took a stand against the Machiavellian strategies of deceit and 
modern conquest employed by the Brits and not passively comply with them in the 
face of the most powerful state in the world.
In 1757–1758, Hübner published his Essai sur l’histoire du droit naturel, which 
according to the title page was published in London. As the title indicated, the work 
was an outline of the history of natural law. Hübner declared in the preface that (like 
so many eighteenth-century thinkers) he had set out to develop a new and original 
system of international law based on the actual history of humankind: a conjectural 
history of modern national and international government informed by the true 
principles of natural jurisprudence. However, his ambitions had been thwarted by 
the circumstance of the outbreak of Seven Years’ War, which Hübner explained, 
made him feel obliged to prematurely publish the imperfect first part of his main 
work, a histoire du code de l’humanité, as a separate text that showed how the 
universal principles of humanity could be gleaned from the history of humankind.7
The telling first words of this first part of a larger project work echoed its political 
aspirations and were clearly written with an eye on international relations: “your 
majesty: natural law is the science of sovereigns.” For Hübner, natural law was a 
tool for understanding the true guidelines for political leadership and the objects 
of good politics. Wise politicians “far from aspiring to sad laurels, bought with the 
blood of subjects” aimed at consolidating peace and believed in the glory of honest 
industry to wealth and power.8
From the start of the work Hübner explained that his findings suggested that 
the wise government of empires took place through the self-government of its 
rulers. States had to train themselves in a form of self-discipline that spread from 
6 Hübner 1756, 18.
7 Hübner 1757, xvii–xix.
8 Hübner 1757, vii–ix.
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the moral self-understanding and self-control of its rulers to the entirety of social 
relations. The government of moral self-assessment was crucial. Politicians had to 
overcome their base natural passions and incorporate them into a higher quality 
set of acquired moral guidelines. Without this kind of self-discipline nothing stood 
in the way of self-deceptive conquest and ambition.9
Hübner’s outlook on the history of humankind and the law of nature resembled 
the views of earlier eighteenth-century Christian moral philosophers.10 This history 
had two parts that were divided by the Fall. With the Fall individuals (and thereby 
human nature as a whole) had lost their God given knowledge of the law of nature, 
but in the course of history had recovered this knowledge over time, across the world, 
by trial and error and accumulated learning. The universal principles of the law of 
nature and nations, which were essentially the same thing in Hübner’s perspective, 
could be grasped through the contemplation of nature and through interaction with 
other human beings. Understanding of these principles and acting upon it reflected 
itself in greater human happiness and higher levels of civilisation. Hübner was not 
a lover of the heroism of antiquity and self-abnegating virtues, nor was he against 
improvement of the arts and higher material living standards that humans might 
enjoy as a result of the accumulation of the rules of civilisation. Yet, he was highly 
suspicious of the ways in which political management of society and of the economy 
could distort the natural human learning process. The unregulated and uncontrolled 
condition of the international realm made him particularly aware of the vulnerability 
of the natural learning process by which human nature was capable of regaining 
paradise. The threat this condition posed to the whole of humanity was related to 
a twofold problem: Hübner pointed out that as yet, while the civilisation of separate 
societies had come a long way since the Fall, no knowledge of any law of nature 
had developed that regulated the interaction between states, let alone a legal basis 
for inter-state action that could be easily learned. The second problem was that 
states in the absence of an integrative law of nations based on knowledge of the law 
of nature had started to compete with each other and recognised no limits to their 
own rights to use force against members of other societies. Thus, the unfortunate 
uncoupling of the development of the law of nations from that of the law of nature 
had led to a situation where the two became opposite forces. The lack of self-control 
of rulers and their societies in the international realm could easily subvert all the 
achievements of human nature in separate societies and destroy peace, tranquillity, 
trade and civilisation. The dominance of this problem in the modern world made it 
the greatest threat to human civilisation. This was why Hübner from the start of his 
treatise characterised the law of nature at the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War as 
“a science of sovereigns” who had not yet developed themselves as scientists.
9 Hübner 1757, ix–xvi.
10 For a typical example, see chapter 2 of Stapelbroek 2007, which discusses the conjectural 
history of humankind formulated by the Roman-Neapolitan cleric Celestino Galiani.
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In part one of the Essai sur l’histoire du droit naturel Hübner accepted that 
Grotius had perfected (or rather formalised) the law of nature a great deal, but the 
problems of the eighteenth century made clear where its weaknesses lay. Grotius 
had been far too erudite, rhetorical and ancient, and had not appreciated the 
consequences of what was the basis of Hübner’s idea of progress: that variations 
in human positive law can be reduced by seeing that they all are, and must be, 
instances of natural law, which has universal value. Nonetheless, despite being 
built on this confusion, from Grotius onwards natural jurisprudence evolved and 
shaped an implicit value system both for individuals and for societies that measured 
the quality of human actions and corresponded to immediate punishments and 
rewards through natural forces. Yet, faced with the acute challenge of silencing 
the threats of eighteenth-century inter-state commercial competition there was an 
imperative need for international law to be improved and put on its proper footing 
of natural law.
The similarity between the aim of Hübner’s project and that of physiocracy, the 
French political economic reform movement also known as that of the économistes, 
led by François Quesnay and the Marquis de Mirabeau, was noticed by Nicolas 
Baudeau, the once anti-physiocrat who became one of the most loyal disciples of 
the sect of Quesnay. In 1767, Baudeau published three long reviews of the Essai sur 
l’histoire du droit naturel in his well-known journal the Ephémérides du citoyen, which 
by then had become a physiocratic journal. The tone of the reviews was sarcastic: 
“those who are familiar with modern expressions need to know that Mr Hübner is 
Danish” is one of the first comments by Baudeau. But through the sarcasm coming 
from a devoted follower of Quesnay the character of Hübner’s work comes out. 
The reviewer agrees with Hübner that man is a pleasure-seeking animal, whose 
instinctive behaviour needs correction by means of a number of rules of conduct: 
these are natural laws. These laws, as was also part of the doctrine of the French 
économistes, can be derived from the history of mankind: they are always the 
same everywhere and the more a nation follows them the happier and wealthier it 
is. Positive laws, for Baudeau as well, are directly related to natural laws.
Yet, within this frame, the physiocratic perspective differed almost entirely from 
Hübner’s. The first set of Baudeau’s criticisms of the Essai sur l’histoire du droit 
naturel regarded ancient history. Baudeau would have liked to see more examples 
from hermetic writings, not just from Greek and Roman antiquity.11 Baudeau also 
did not share Hübner’s criticisms of Sparta and his view of property laws, but in 
his review in the Ephémérides left unexplained why exactly not. Baudeau’s more 
serious objections, however, concerned Hübner’s insistence on the progress in the 
“governing of the passions” and the superiority of modernity over ancient times. 
11 It seems that Baudeau was arguing that it would be useful to consider classical and earlier 
ancient writings from the perspective of physiocratic doctrine.
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Here, Baudeau commented that a similar attack on ancient virtue can nowadays 
be found in Shaftesbury.12 Yet, Baudeau argued, the emergence of increasingly 
modern sociability after the Fall required a good deal more than simply the passing 
of time. The history of human nature, according to Baudeau looked very different 
from the simple ascendance that Hübner supposed and was much more muddled 
and covered in bloodshed.13 Likewise, to overcome the problems of eighteenth-
century commercial competition between states and to get human nature on the 
right track again, after being exposed to the corruptions of luxury and artificial 
inequality imposed by Colbertist political economy, a lot more active reforms given 
in by scientific truths taken from “physical” “self-evident” facts were required than a 
simple – even if radical – correction of international legal practice. From Baudeau’s 
point of view, Hübner was a typical mid-eighteenth-century natural sociability 
theorist who thought that people’s pleasures and culture were interrelated in such 
a stable form that any political problems that rulers might have came from their 
abuse of power in the international realm, not at least as much from an inherited 
problem of modern commercial culture that lay at the foundations of inter-state 
relations and represented a far more profound politically imposed conflation of the 
true principles of commerce.14 Moreover, although Hübner was right to say that laws 
did not really come from convention and that treaties cannot really be obligations, 
be universal, or have perpetual power unless they have natural bases,15 it was the 
case, according to Baudeau, that in arguing against his predecessors and pointing 
out their droit chimerique,”16 Hübner had been more successful than in arguing the 
self-evident truth, which was what lay at the basis of physiocracy.
Baudeau’s conclusion was that Hübner had based himself too uncritically on 
the idea that among nations there were universal natural bonds and laws. Hübner 
had naively suggested that humans were naturally sociable and had extended this 
idea to the realm of international law, much like the natural lawyer Christian Wolff 
had done, according to Baudeau.17 Hübner’s views stood in shrill contrast with the 
physiocratic idea of the international order and the kind of reform that was required 
to settle the European peace problem. The physiocratic take on the state of 
12 Baudeau 1767, part II, 117–118.
13 See Sonenscher 2007, 189–222 and 2002 for a reconstruction of the physiocratic take on human 
history. See also Longhitano 1999.
14 Baudeau 1767, Part II, 119. Consequently, from Baudeau’s perspective the differences between 
Grotius and Hübner did not matter so much anymore: Like Grotius, Hübner had wanted to write a 
code of humanity, but where Grotius had failed (and both Hübner and Baudeau agreed he had) 
because of a number of circumstances, his views at least represented the spirit of the age, whereas 
Hübner, Baudeau argued, had not done any better, but still felt entitled to criticise Grotius for his 
erudition and his empirical method “to prove laws by quoting ancient sources”.
15 Baudeau 1767, Part II, 143.
16 Baudeau 1767, Part II, 139–141. 
17 Baudeau 1767, Part II, 143.
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European societies in the mid eighteenth century was that all modern nations were 
punished for their deviation from the natural order of things and for not following the 
natural order of economic progress. Nations nor individuals were naturally sociable 
and both had to be kicked back into their natural physical shape. The state that first 
found back its natural shape would automatically rise to greatness and enforce the 
same model onto other states. Whereas Hübner believed in the civilising effects 
of modern commerce and urged that politicians adopted its true principles in the 
international sphere, the physiocratic counterpoint resided in an updated version 
of the French anti-modern agriculturalist movements of the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth century that were a reaction to Colbert’s political economy.18
Hübner’s image of the history of humankind lay also at the basis of an article 
he published in 1759 (even though it was written in 1757–1758)19 in the Journal 
de commerce entitled Reflexions impartiales sur le droit des nations belligerantes 
de saisir les batimens neutres.20 Although humankind within separate groups and 
nations had gone through the general movement of a gradual ascent of moral 
knowledge through reflection and commercial sociability, with regard to other 
nations knowledge of the law of nature had remained greatly underdeveloped. In 
his 1759 article, Hübner was concerned with the fact that neutral trading nations 
were seen to be trying to sustain war out of motives of profit. This was the opposite 
of what the law of nature dictated were the duties of neutral states in war and what 
the historical proved was the optimal way to minimise the harm done to the interest 
of humankind by conflict. As a general rule, the positions adopted by neutrals were 
first and foremost to be conducive to the restoration of calm and peace, which 
benefited all states.21 Neutrals had to isolate war and restrict their commerce with 
belligerents in some ways, certainly not extend it and thereby exploit and amplify 
conflict. If this general rule was adopted, whenever states saw themselves forced to 
measure their powers against each other, much of their commercial contacts with 
other states had to be interrupted while they were at war. As soon as it was decided 
who was the strongest the war was over and with minimal damage commercial 
exchange between all states could resume.
However, going against these insights, the principles of which could be 
deduced from history, modern diplomacy and naval courts had given rise to an 
altogether different and misguided practice aimed at the definition both of rules of 
equal treatment of belligerents by neutrals and of rules that stipulated which goods 
18 See Rothkrug 1965, Sonenscher 2002 and 2007.
19 See the introduction of De la saisie des batimens neutres, ou Du Droit qu’ont les Nations 
Belligérantes d’arrêter les Navires des Peuples Amis Dedica a son excellence Monseigneur le baron 
de Bernstorff , which was published in 1759 Hübner, 1759b, iii–iv. 
20 Hübner 1759, 39–66.
21 Hübner 1759, 45.
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neutrals were not allowed to trade in altogether in times of war. According to this 
practice, in which positive law and treaties were dominant, justice and impartiality 
resided in determining when goods came to fall under the term contraband and 
under what conditions they could be free for neutrals to trade with. But how could a 
state that had natural resources ever justly be banned from selling iron to another 
state that was at peace with everyone, even if iron was used to make guns, Hübner 
objected?22 The consequence of uncoupling neutrality from natural law, Hübner 
believed, was an inlet for power politics into the realm of international law. The 
invention of the term contraband itself was a corruption of the idea of neutrality 
from the point of view of Hübner’s idea of natural law and made it subject to a 
struggle of national interests over the rights of belligerents and neutrals. The very 
emergence of this perverse struggle Hübner attributed to the “modern custom” of 
“jealousy of trade” that made states so envious of each other’s commerce that they 
forgot about considering the development of their own economies in their proper 
perspective.23 In that context, the English depredations of neutral vessels in the 
Seven Years’ War was inspired by the Machiavellian intention to make sure that 
neutral states would not profit and relatively become wealthier and more powerful 
than even the belligerent that won the war as a result of staying out of that war.
Whereas with regard to civil law individuals had learned to live by the laws of 
nature, the modern practise of commercial warfare threatened to throw humankind 
back into a Hobbesian state of nature, or rather a post-diluvian absence of knowledge 
of the law of nature.24 In so far as rulers had at all come to grips with the law of 
nature in international relations their knowledge had developed very slowly and 
had been hindered by a reluctantly on the part of rulers to accept it, which is why 
they had throughout history emphasised the chimerical distinction between utility 
and justice.25 Yet, the well-being of European states and the “honour of humanity” 
dictated the abrogation of the custom of the seizure of neutral ships which in reality 
was destitute of any form of justice.
The article by Hübner in the Journal de commerce served to create a platform 
and audience for his larger treatise that was published in two volumes later in 
1759 [although perhaps it was antedated] in The Hague, entitled De la saisie 
des batimens neutres, ou Du Droit qu’ont les Nations Belligérantes d’arrêter les 
Navires des Peuples Amis Dedica a son excellence Monseigneur le baron de 
Bernstorff. The work was translated a few times in the rest of the eighteenth 
century and remained influential throughout Europe during that period, particularly 
22 Hübner 1759, 48.
23 Hübner 1759, 53.
24 Hübner 1759, 56–57.
25 Hübner 1759, 64.
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during the War of the American Independence.26 Notably, there was an Italian 
edition published in 1778 in Genoa under the title Del sequestro de’ bastimenti 
neutrali ovvero: del diritto che hanno le nazioni belligeranti d’arrestare i bastimenti 
de’ popoli amici. When Ferdinando Galiani published his Dei doveri dei principi 
neutrali in 1782 (which I will discuss below), he identified Hübner as his direct 
predecessor, just like he had identified Jean-François Melon in his first work 
Della moneta as the best political economist until then. The Saisie des batimens 
neutres would be influential across Europe both for Hübner’s general outlook on 
commerce and neutrality and for his practical proposals, especially his suggestion 
that an international prize court was required as a partial remedy for the time 
being to discourage belligerent nations from capturing neutral ships.27 Practically 
speaking, only if the jurisdiction over arrests of ships in full sea could be removed 
from national courts it could eventually be possible to put neutrality on the right 
footing afterwards. To enable that option it was necessary to break down the 
artificial legal barriers connecting warfare and trade that Europe’s dominant states 
(mainly Britain, and previously the United Provinces) had created, that Grotius’s 
natural law thought had not prevented and that was about to plunge the whole of 
European civilisation back into the darkest epochs in human history.
The immediate reception of the Saisie des batimens neutres in the context of the 
Seven Years’ War was also coloured by its different stance towards the international 
political relations of the time, compared with that in the Politique Danois. A reviewer 
of the work for the Journal œconomique of 1760 agreed with Hübner’s perspective 
on neutrality in the Saisie des batimens neutres and considered it the best treatment 
of the topic, written by a subject of a truly neutral court. However, the reviewer also 
noticed a divergence between the message of the work to reject the struggle over 
rights of belligerents and neutrals and pave the way for a reintroduction of natural 
law into international law and the plea for action against Britain and the assertion 
of extensive rights of neutrals in the Politique Danois. Ruling out the possibility 
that the Saisie des batimens neutres was a skilfully dressed up attempt to support 
the aims that inspired the Politique Danois, the reviewer declared he refused to 
believe, on conceptual as well as on stylistic grounds, that the author of De la saisie 
des batimens neutres really was the same person that wrote the Politique Danois, 
which took such a radical anti-English position and was far from truly neutral.28
26 Hübner’s influence was greatest during the time of the War of the American Independence. His 
name, for instance, appeared prominently in the pamphlet debate surrounding the Dutch discussions 
about whether or not to join Catherine the Great’s League of Armed Neutrality.
27 This idea became an important part of Hübner’s legacy. See for example Holland 1921, 190.
28 Ere Nokkala has drawn my attention to another instance where Hübner’s authorship of the 
Politique Danois was questioned. The German Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, in his Die Chimäre 
des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt, of 1759, argued that it was not Hübner, but the 
French publicist Jean-Henri Maubert de Gouvest who had written the Politique Danois, which to me 
seems highly plausible. See Adam 2006, 83, note 71, who claims that the attributions by Justi (and 
Kaeber) to Maubert were false and that the author really was Hübner.
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Emer de Vattel: The Mistaken “Perfection” 
of the International Order29
The legacy of Emer de Vattel within the history of international law is far greater than 
that of Hübner. The character of Vattel’s views also has been subject to frequent 
discussion, at the end of the eighteenth century, as well as in the beginning of the 
twentieth century – when the outbreak of World War I and the effective collapse 
of the rights of neutral states in the context of submarine warfare was considered 
the final blow to Vattel’s vision of international order.30 Presumably because Vattel 
was the most influential eighteenth-century natural law theorist and because his 
work has in the past been interpreted among so many different lines and was 
associated with so many ideological directions, scholarly attention for his works 
has recently grown. Here, I only want to discuss a number of points and put these 
next to the previous discussion of the basic views of the history of humankind and 
the eighteenth-century problem of neutrality and trade by Martin Hübner.
Emer de Vattel was a Prussian citizen by birth, but came from the Swiss 
region of Neufchatel.31 Vattel had a diplomatic career not in Berlin, but in the minor 
German power of Saxony. In later times the main message of his 1758 magnum 
opus Le droit des gens, ou principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués a la conduite 
et aux affaires des nations et des souverains has often been construed as an 
ingenious way of selling out international law to power politics. Yet, thanks to recent 
scholarship these judgements themselves are now increasingly seen as a product 
of their own ideological backgrounds, which has paved the way for a much better 
and richer understanding of the subtleties and authentic meaning of Vattel’s main 
work.32 Having said that, Vattel still can be placed in line with his predecessor 
Cornelius Bynkershoek, who attempted to radically redevelop the Grotian law of 
nature approach in favour of one based on, or rather in accordance with, the jus 
gentium, politeness, diplomacy and the balance of power. Bynkershoek’s shift from 
natural justice to the actual workings of politics as the central point in international 
legal theory created the conditions that in the Seven Years’ War made the law of 
neutrality subject to debate between decisions by governments of neutral states 
29 For my presentation of Vattel’s political and moral thought in this section I am indebted to 
discussions with Petter Korkman and to Isaac Nakhimovsky’s unpublished paper, ‘Commercial 
Neutrality and Vattel’s Vision of a European Commonwealth’, which he delivered at a workshop on 
‘Neutrality in the Eighteenth Century’ that I organised in Rotterdam, November 2005. A modified 
version of that paper was published as Nakhimovsky 2007. For Korkman’s views on Vattel, see his 
paper in this volume.
30 See Jouannet 2004.
31 See Vattel 1747 and 1757; The introduction of Vattel 2008 by Béla Kapossy and Richard 
Whatmore contains a concise biography of Vattel’s life and career.
32 See e.g., Jouannet 1998.
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and naval courts of belligerents.33 By urging the Dutch government to adopt a more 
assertive approach towards claiming rights to trade with other neutral states as 
well as with belligerents, Bynkershoek paved the way for a far-reaching reform 
of international law. By removing the Grotian legal veil, which drew upon a basic 
theory of justice between individuals, from the inter-state sphere Bynkershoek 
contributed to the creation of a legal void with regard to the neutrality of trade that 
had to be dealt with, in order to immunise the tendency of small military conflicts to 
spiral off into all-out warfare. 
In as much as Vattel followed Bynkershoek, his aim was not to restrict or minimize 
the logical relationship between the law of nature and international law to create 
space for new right claims. Instead, I will argue that the purpose of Vattel’s Droit des 
gens was to explain in an altogether different way, one, how the international order 
that existed could be considered in accordance with the law of nature, and, two, 
how the principles of the law of nations were to be understood in order to have any 
hopes that eventually international law and politics might be reconciled. Or, as the 
reviewer of the Journal de Commerce in 1759 formulated it: “Mr Vattel considers 
the principle objects of Good Government, of the Arts, Agriculture and Commerce 
through the principles of the Law of Nature, on which the good government of these 
matter that are important both domestically and abroad needs to be based.”34 
Vattel has often been seen (though much less so by contemporaries than by later 
international lawyers and modern historians) as providing a dissimulating perversion 
of the ideas of Christian Wolff, the Prussian moral philosopher who Vattel himself 
declared to be following to a large extent and whose ideas he said to intended 
to publicise in a “wider circle of readers.”35 However, Vattel’s declared adherence 
to Wolff’s view may have to be taken more seriously, possibly as a recognition 
on the part of Vattel that Wolff’s outlook on human sociability was the one that 
best described the basics of how the international realm could form a sustainable 
entity without requiring all that much intervention, arbitration and coercion. For 
Vattel, Wolff’s theory of sociability showed, against Wolff’s own conclusions, how 
human nature well-understood provided a substantial basis for improvement of 
the international environment of trade politics.36 Although Vattel emphasised the 
fundamental flaw in the traditional parallel between individuals living under a civil 
law and the multitude of states that existed in the world, which, as historians have 
often stressed, naturally led to a minimal conception of natural sociability, he still 
felt that the divided nature of humankind did not call for a superstate legislative 
33 See Akashi 1998 and Helfman 2005.
34 Journal de commerce 1759, 141–142.
35 Nowadays, Vattel is mainly seen as a critic of Wolff e.g., Tuck 1999. For Vattel’s adherence to 
Wollf, Vattel 2008, III: 6a.7a.
36 This is how I read Vattel 1762.
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force, or the development of strongly regulative public law that resembled in its 
strictness the construction of justice through civil law.37
At the beginning of his career as a writer, Vattel published numerous short(er) 
works on a wide range of moral subjects.38 In these writings Vattel developed 
an intriguing notion of individual self-interest. Vattel held a strong belief that the 
principle of self-interest by itself was a sufficient motive to produce sustainable 
social interaction. Whereas many contemporaries adopted ideas of self-interest that 
required an additional element or countervailing principle to make self-interested 
motives socially feasible, Vattel argued that there was nothing that gave people as 
much pleasure as helping each other.39 The Christian notion of benevolence did 
not exist in his system, since self-interest did not need to be counteracted. People 
derived higher order pleasures and utility from being altruistic. In the course of this 
process they simultaneously improved their pleasure and developed increasing 
social cohesion. Through the other-regarding sentiment of pleasurable altruism, 
people “perfected” themselves and grew into tightly connected groups of persons, 
or nations. The manner in which Vattel argued his position was in tune with the 
style and content of the most advanced moral philosophers of the time who mixed 
technical concepts of motivational psychology with playful examples to argue out 
their positions. Here Vattel distinguished himself from those thinkers who might 
with more reason be accused of Epicureanism. The key to Vattel’s understanding 
of self-interest lay in its developmental aspect. As soon as individual basic needs 
were satisfied, pleasure automatically became sociable, since it could not be 
increased but by involving the ideas of others.40 Humans had a natural yearning for 
“perfected”, super-instinctive or civilised, self-interest. “Perfection” implied reflection 
and therefore itself provided a mechanism that checked the social quality of human 
behaviour. Here, Vattel’s views were close to the views developed by a number 
of sophisticated Christian moral philosophers across Europe – as he himself 
recognised in his declared following of Wolff for example.41 Moreover, apparently in 
agreement with these philosophers, Vattel also recognised that the development of 
higher order pleasures could lead a society in the wrong direction, where pleasures 
were at odds with the law of nature and were not matched by the actual workings 
of the natural and social world, which made them false pleasures. However, in the 
37 See Tuck 1999 and Nakhimovsky 2007. Cf. the review of the Droit des gens in the Journal de 
commerce 1759 which understood Vattel’s project in the same way, yet still equally as an attempt to 
justify the British abuses of the neutrality of trade.
38 See Vattel 1747 and 1757. The introduction of the new edition of The Law of Nations, by Béla 
Kapossy and Richard Whatmore gives an overview and bibliography of Vattel’s early works.
39 The idea comes out repeatedly and strongly from the first five essays of Vattel 1747.
40 This was the central point of Vattel’s moral philosophy that was a prominent part of his early 
writings Vattel 1747, 1757, that would inspire his anti-Rousseauian views and that was echoed in the 
Droit des gens 2008.
41 See Vattel 1762 and 2008.
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defining of what was required for a society to retain its stability and accordance with 
the law of nature, Vattel set much greater store by the self-equilibrating mechanisms 
of human nature than many Christian thinkers whose views led to a certain degree 
of moralising calls for political guarding of the virtue of the nation. In his early 
writings on moral subjects Vattel flirted with sceptical tropes and explained through 
clever sociological observations how games were a socially productive pastime 
and how people were naturally inclined, as a form of socially stabilising self-deceit, 
to believe in the afterlife.42 The flipside of this argument within the field of moral 
philosophy was that, according to Vattel, to explain society it was “more natural and 
more solid” to start with the human urge to strive for happiness, rather than with a 
metaphysical theory of moral obligation.43 Thus, Vattel objected to the structure of 
Wolff’s moral philosophy, since it started with an idea of moral obligation, instead of 
an analysis of how human happiness came about. Subsequently, Vattel was able to 
follow a different route in identifying the conditions that monitored social outcomes 
of individual interest-seeking. In this way Vattel could present himself as a follower 
of Wolff and keep a safe distance from moral sceptical forms of Epicureanism, 
even though he did not need to adopt Wolff’s rich view of moral obligation as the 
formal starting point of his natural sociability theory.
Where Vattel with regard to the perfection of individuals argued for the utility of 
sociable self-interest, so he saw the perfection of states as focused on appropriate 
economic development. In a long review of the Droit des Gens, published in 1759 
in the April and May issues of the Journal de Commerce – the same journal where 
Hübner published his article that introduced his De la saisie des batimens neutres 
– it was remarked that Vattel’s natural law theory matched his economic ideas of 
“the true principles .. of the most natural order”.44 Within this order Vattel attached 
a primary importance to agricultural development, not to modern commerce and 
luxury, which had since the later seventeenth century taken centre stage in political 
efforts to spur economic growth. States could rise to greatness, and all states 
together benefit from each other’s greatness in a commercially friendly political 
Balance of Power system if agriculture was generally accepted as the key to 
national economic growth. The Journal de commerce made much of the central 
42 See Vattel 1747, but especially 1757, which contains a number of apparently free reflections 
on ancient and modern moral philosophical tropes that show a great deal of Vattel’s ideas on 
sociability.
43 Quoted in Journal de Commerce 1759, 5: “Il est donc plus naturel & plus solide, de prendre 
le soin de notre félicité pour l’objet de notre prémiere & plus générale obligation; puisque l’amour 
de nous-mêmes étant notres prémier mobile, & l’obligation n’étant autre chose que la connexion 
du motif avec l’action; l’obligation de travailler à notre bonheur est la prémiere, la plus générale, & 
même le fondement de toutes les autres.” 
44 Journal de commerce 1759, 141.
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role of agriculture in Vattel’s Droit des Gens and came close to identifying him 
explicitly as a latent radical anti-Colbertist.45
The theoretical problem that Vattel started his Droit des gens with must be seen 
in this light. In the opening pages of his main work, Vattel criticised the entire history 
of natural law discourse and professed his allegiance to Wolff, who had insisted that 
natural law had to be adopted as a moral code for states, just like it was generally 
regarded at the level of individuals. Vattel argued that the parallel could neither be 
loose, like Grotius had allowed it to be as a result of which the “common consent of 
mankind” was the source of a mere “Arbitrary Law of Nations;” nor be too strict and 
mirror the form of law that regulated the behaviour of citizens in the state, like Wolff 
had suggested who wanted to see the natural law for states as “the civil law … of a 
great republic (civitatis maximæ) instituted by nature herself, and of which all nations 
of the world are members”.46 For Vattel, there was no necessary contradiction in 
that there was a real, non-voluntary connection of political decision-making to the 
law of nature, but that at the same time it could absolutely not be denied that states 
were independent, sovereign and had the kind of rights and liberties that made the 
international order look like a state of nature. In eighteenth-century Europe, inter-
state rivalry became a problem only because the politically engendered mistaken 
economic “perfection” of societies had led to the imperfect integration of nations in 
their relations towards each other.
Vattel was very aware of the reality this situation created and of the necessity 
to somehow change it. At the same time, there was nothing legally wrong about 
the system in which the conflict had arisen and escalated. Natural law discourse 
should not be bent to fit the reality of the Seven Years’ War. Rather the political 
economy of states had to be corrected and realigned with what the Journal de 
Commerce saw as Vattel’s view of a natural “perfection” of nations. Likewise, Vattel 
gave numerous examples of rights of belligerents that fit with his system and that 
led to big controversies (and gave Vattel an undeserved reputation in later times). 
Yet, the real problem was the unnatural competition between states that had arisen 
because their economies had not developed and integrated with each other in the 
way they should have, as a result of which belligerents used rights to interfere with 
other states’ trade that otherwise they would never have been tempted to use. 
Vattel, it seems, saw states behaving in the international realm the way individuals 
would who had been over socialised and made sensitive to pride, dignity and 
honour, without possessing lower order socialised selfish faculties.
45 Journal de commerce 1759, 152–155.
46 See the preface of Vattel 2008; see also Journal de commerce 1759, 137–141. Cf. the introduction 
of Vattel 2008 and Tuck 1999, 192.
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Vattel’s diagnosis that the international order was not well-constructed and 
sufficiently integrated was his explanation for why the natural interest-seeking of 
states wandered in territories where their actions became self-defeating. Yet, how 
could it be changed? The easy answer was that a new outlook on the character of 
natural law for states was required to develop to be able to eventually overcome 
the problem of a perverse states system. Yet, that was no solution. Vattel, as a 
clever observer of societies, including international society, knew what luxury, 
jealousy, economic nationalism and manufacturing competition were and did not 
believe that agricultural supremacy would instantly rise to turn around the reality 
of international relations. To cope with the state of affairs and pave the way for a 
brighter future by limiting the present abuses of natural rights Vattel (like Hübner) 
decided that, since it was agricultural development that really mattered to start 
with, it was best to devise a law of neutrality that separated trade in higher end – 
mistakenly presumed to be directly “perfecting” – goods from the more essential 
and fundamental need based trade of subsistence goods.47 The first kind of trade 
remained subject to all the natural rights that states had to interfere with each 
other’s commerce; the second was to be considered an inviolable realm of natural, 
politically neutral, exchange between individuals. To that end, Vattel attempted to 
distinguished needs from luxury, thereby going against the grain of the by then 
generally accepted presupposition within the eighteenth-century luxury debate 
that it was impossible to define “real needs” from superfluous consumption without 
taking away the very grounds for the existence of trade.48
Vattel’s reluctance to interfere directly with the most prominent legal problems of 
neutrality and trade at the time already earned him the reputation of someone who 
failed to protect trade against the excesses of warfare. The second part of the review 
of the work by the Journal de Commerce (of May 1759) from the start was highly 
critical of Vattel’s Droit des gens. It argued that on Vattel’s account the freedom to act 
upon one’s needs to protect one’s own interest, that Vattel recognised in international 
law, gave states like England the right to destroy – in a neo-Machiavellian way – the 
commerce of neutral states. The reviewer concluded that Vattel, despite his “formal” 
recognition of the importance of trade for the law of nature and the progress of 
nations did not come to any legal political solution that was an improvement upon the 
actual practice that turned Europe into an arena of economic warfare. 
Although this judgement of Vattel’s Droit des gens by a contemporary is 
representative of the way in which the work has been received throughout centuries, 
it does not do justice to Vattel’s outlook on the issues he was dealing with. Further 
47 For the argument that Vattel’s views on the interstate system derive from his ideas on luxury see 
Nakhimovsky 2007.
48 For a masterful cross-section of the luxury debate of the first half of eighteenth century see 
Hont 2006.
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comparison with Hübner on the basis of this argument (which is beyond the scope 
of this article), would probably show Vattel as equally concerned as Hübner with 
the reform of a situation that unfortunately arose in the eighteenth century when 
political and commercial reasonings collided. Still, in the course of the War of the 
American Independence the names Vattel and Hübner figured as two reference 
points used by opponents arguing about the rights and duties of neutral trade. 
A rather different angle on problems of neutrality and trade was provided by the 
Neapolitan Ferdinando Galiani, who discussed the matter from a historically based 
perspective on the history of humankind. 
Ferdinando Galiani: The Primitive Warlike 
Customs of Maritime Commerce
In 1751 Ferdinando Galiani published his first major work Della moneta on the nature 
of commercial society and the consequences this had for the possibilities for the 
reform of the Neapolitan economy.49 His most famous work was the Dialogues sur 
le commerce des bleds (1770, Paris), an incisive critique of the ideas underpinning 
a major attempt to reform the French economy and get rid of the state debt by 
means of a radical liberalisation of the grain market.50 Galiani’s last work Dei doveri 
dei principi neutrali, of 1782 (Naples), in comparison, is much less studied and has 
as yet not been recognised as an important contribution to the European debate 
on trade, war and neutrality at the time of the War of the American Independence.51 
Galiani himself wrote in a letter about the work when it was in progress that it “will 
be boring up to the point that one will think that Wolff or Pufendorf is the author.” Yet, 
even if its sometimes technical language and detailed engagement with previous 
legal views went against Galiani’s own stylistic taste, the work contains original 
ideas about the history of maritime trade since antiquity in connection to the legal 
aspects of eighteenth-century commercial rivalry that remain to be discovered.
The publication of Dei doveri dei principi neutrali must be seen in a number of 
contexts: the Neapolitan struggle to preserve its fragile independence and set up a 
foreign trade, the emergence of Russia as a great power and the diplomatic shifts 
in the post-Seven Years’ War era increasing the pressure on the Mediterranean, 
and the launch of a League of Armed Neutrality in 1780 by the Russian Empress 
Catherine the Great.52 The combination of these factors resulted in a novel situation 
for Neapolitan foreign trade politics that Galiani responded to. Thirty years earlier, 
49 See Stapelbroek 2007.
50 See Galiani 1958. For the context of the work see Kaplan 1976. The best study of the Dialogues 
is still Venturi 1960, although I disagree with its conclusions: see the epilogue of Stapelbroek 2007.
51 The best study of the work so far is Diaz 1968.
52 The standard work on the diplomatic history of the first Armed Neutrality is De Madariaga 1963.
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in Della moneta, Galiani had argued that rather than to embark on great foreign 
trade projects Naples should try to modernise its agriculture, find fish in the 
Mediterranean and explore the possibility of extending trade to the East by cutting 
through the isthmus of Suez. For the rest it was best to wait for new opportunities. 
Trade in the Mediterranean was aggressively dominated by France and England 
and Naples would be blown out of the water if it tried to mix with these powers. 
Yet, at the height of the War of the American Independence Russia had become 
a dominant power in Eastern Europe and explored possibilities for accessing the 
Mediterranean and for setting up trade there. Because Russia did not have a large 
enough merchant fleet itself, it had an interest in keeping shipping tariffs low. In her 
efforts to turn the Mediterranean into as much of a neutral trade zone as possible, 
Catherine II found an ally in Galiani, who since the late 1770s had become an 
influential figure at court and wrote a number of foreign policy advice documents in 
which he explored new possibilities for setting up foreign trade.53
In the autumn of 1780, Catherine II issued a declaration including five principles 
of Armed neutrality that served to justify the armed defence of neutral ships against 
belligerent powers. The real purpose and envisaged functioning and effects of the 
declaration have remained an enigma ever since. Catherine’s claim, that goods 
on board of ships sailing under flags of neutral powers would be protected by 
the armed powers of these states, met with wonder, in her own court, as well 
as in European diplomatic circles. Between 1780 and 1783 all principal European 
powers, apart from England, announced their adhesion to the League. Although 
given in by Russia’s interest as a rising commercial power to access the Baltic and 
the Mediterranean and often suspected to be an anti-British ploy or an attempt 
by Catherine to manipulate the existing Balance of Power, the League of Armed 
neutrality was also considered across Europe as an alternative peace plan.54
Among the states that joined the League was Naples, where the main architect 
of the accession was Ferdinando Galiani. To justify the Neapolitan position adopted 
in 1783, Galiani had published in the previous year Dei doveri dei principi neutrali, 
in which he gave an historical account of the conditions that caused the uncertain 
development of modern natural law discourse and the European treaty system. 
In reality, Galiani’s perspective on eighteenth-century commercial rivalry and 
international politics in Dei doveri dei principi neutrali was based on his juvenile 
theory of sociability and the history of humankind. In a number of lectures he 
gave as a teenager he explained that “love drives and gives life to the commerce 
53 All of Galiani’s foreign policy advice texts (which are preserved by the Biblioteca della Società 
Napoletana di Storia Patria [BSNSP] and the Archivio Nazionale in Naples) that have been published 
are collected in Galiani 1999.
54 I am hoping to be able to publish some of my research on this topic in the near future to show 
the different perceptions across Europe, and indeed America, of the meaning and the significance 
of the first Armed Neutrality.
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of mankind.”55 Loves were primitive simple feelings that were “always excited 
involuntarily, and often also in spite of ourselves.”56 Through “a capacity” in the 
brain “to connect separate and distinct ideas,” loves evolved into attitudes towards 
the world that governed man’s perception of reality.57 Love shaped individual 
self-interest, which was not essentially an anti-social (selfish) category, as both 
Hobbesian and Christian thinkers maintained, but rather an aspect of psychological 
development. Galiani had a sceptical idea about how these loves generated social 
interaction, group feeling, religion and governed the commercial monitoring of 
political power through ideas of admiration, wealth, honour, luxury and inequality: 
when natural loves were threatened to be frustrated people were able to divert 
them onto another object. It was central to the human emotional system to form 
self-deceptive opinions that suppressed one’s real loves, making it impossible to 
ever have them again in their single natural form. Galiani used various cognates 
to describe self-deceit (inganno, ingannar se stesso, il proprio inganno as well as 
menzogna) and various terms to signal its epistemic characteristics (illusione, falsità, 
inganno utile e innocente) to define a kind of false perception that man developed 
in pursuit of his “loves” and to prevent them from remaining unsatisfied. 
The duality of natural and social love enabled Galiani to present self-deceit 
as a positive key to understanding morality and explain its emergence without 
presupposing either any innate virtuous or self-interested capacity in man. In the 
process Galiani had devised a notion of self-interest that he felt more accurately 
reflected the causes of human pleasure than any previous notion. Since self-
interest was an expression of a subjective desire-led false world view of individuals, 
its configuration changed along with people’s self-deceit and had much greater 
flexibility than any idea of self-interest that hinged on any innate virtuous or selfish 
capacity. Moreover, crucially, this theory of the development of the human passions 
fit neatly with Galiani’s historical perspective of the development of societies and 
their institutions since antiquity. In other words: Galiani’s moral philosophy was 
designed to explain the history of humankind. In fact, in the late 1740s Galiani’s 
project (which he abandoned when he realised his ambitions had been to large) 
was to write a work entitled ‘The Art of Government’ that fully integrated these two 
approaches into one narrative.58
55 See Stapelbroek 2007, chapter 4.
56 The manuscript is in the BSNSP, xxxi.a.9. ff. 91–100. References are to Galiani 1975, apart from 
a few differences where the text transcribed by Diaz and Guerci does not include minor deletions 
and insertions in the manuscript.
57 Galiani 1975, 691–692.
58 See Galiani 1999, 1–3, which unfortunately does not represent the typological structure that 
Galiani put into his description of the history of humankind.
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In 1751, in Della moneta, Galiani transformed this moral-historical understanding 
of the development of commercial societies into a political economic vision for 
the future of Naples in the international system. In the core chapter of the book, 
he explained that the value of money at any point in time ultimately derived from 
principles that were part of human nature itself; money was certainly not a human 
invention by which people deliberately changed the societies they lived in. It 
emerged naturally out of the gradual modification of people’s loves into social ideas 
of value that inspired commercial interaction. Money did not emerge by agreement 
and its existence was not reliant on promises, trust, or any additional moral capacity 
of self-restraint. If this had been different commerce could never have become 
central to modern societies. 
Galiani defended commercial sociability on the grounds that it was the outcome 
of the historical progress of human nature, which was a process that realised its 
own objective moral criteria. He argued vehemently that societies that had come 
to be ruled by money were less corruptible by politics than earlier forms of society. 
The complex non-linear and often-interrupted history of money was directly related 
to the rise and fall of states in both antiquity and modernity and the development of 
cultural characteristics of the dominant societies in the course of time. Throughout 
history people constantly reshaped their fictional moral beliefs, thereby gradually 
creating the mental preconditions for commercial society.59
This historical and moral philosophical perspective was the background from 
which Galiani considered trade and the interstate system around 1780 and evaluated 
the prospects for Naples to become a major Mediterranean trading power and take 
over the trade of other Italian states in the region. The main threat to Galiani’s 
vision was interference by Europe’s dominant states, but these were kept at bay by 
Russia’s Catherine the Great, who had far greater interests in cleaning up the trade 
of the South-East Mediterranean and to get rid of pirates and privateers. To signpost 
the purpose of the work, Galiani (who was a brilliant classicist) inserted a large 
number of epigraphs into the chapters and parts of Dei doveri dei principi neutrali 
that were taken from ancient South-Italian writers who glorified the peaceful trade 
and prosperity in the South-East Mediterranean and the Dardanelles strait that 
lay at the bedrock of modern European civilisation. These epigraphs are the link 
between the policy advice documents written by Galiani and the main argument of 
Dei doveri dei principi neutrali, a diagnosis of the eighteenth-century hindrances 
to the further progress of humankind by being able to immunise trade from the 
vicissitudes of war.
In Dei doveri dei principi neutrali Galiani complained that the significant problems 
in integrating the logics of trade and power in eighteenth-century interstate politics 
59 Galiani 1963, 26–27.
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had not just emerged because of the apparent difficulty of determining the precise 
rules of their respective limits and interrelations. In political and legal discourses of 
the time there was great uncertainty as to what moral principles of human nature 
were the right ones and how obligation to comply with the rules of justice could be 
politically enforced. According to Galiani however, the neutrality of trade could only 
have become the central problem of international politics because the casuistic style 
of reasoning that natural lawyers deployed in their arguments on the rights and duties 
of belligerent and neutral states in wartime had created these uncertainties, thereby 
amplifying the actual problem. The original cause of the situation in international 
politics that had emerged was not to be found through any of the available combined 
political, legal and moral analyses of human nature and reconstructions of where its 
development had gone wrong. These intellectual exercises themselves had given 
rise to a myriad of groundless distinctions that confused and misrepresented the real 
problem. Galiani insisted that the issue at hand was much simpler than that, and 
that its resolution did not require a moral education or grand reform of humankind 
and its leaders either. What had happened was that since the collapse of the Roman 
Empire dominant states in Europe had frequently given in to the temptation to take 
recourse to ancient maritime customs which subsequently had become engrained 
in the legal practices of European states. 
The counterpoint, for Galiani, to the proper regulation of trade in the international 
arena was Rome, not just the Empire, but also the republic that grew out of 
extensive tribal warfare in the Mediterranean. Rome once had considered itself the 
only civilised nation in the Mediterranean, because it had transformed the exercise 
of primitive aggression towards other tribes into a more structured professional 
military approach, which defined the superiority of Roman society and gave it a 
moral and legal right over the entire world.60 Where other tribes plundered ships in 
the Mediterranean driven by natural passions of revenge and desire for bloodshed, 
Rome did the same inspired by a superior ideology of empire and conquest, which 
gave it a series of self-declared rights and entitled it to the goods of other tribes. 
In this way, driven by the ideological cultivation of warlike national animosity into a 
cult of republican virtue, Rome became rich and powerful and only collapsed when 
its military customs towards the outside world became too civilised to match the 
primitive aggression of neighbouring tribes.
Throughout Dei doveri dei principi neutrali Galiani inserted a number of 
historical sketches of the ways in which powerful states in European history since 
the later middle ages crushed treaties that created order in the interrelations of 
trade and war (like Louis XIV scuffed the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659, just 
60 Galiani 1942, 423–433.
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when it had effectively created a stable European public law)61 and used force to 
violate the trade of smaller states, notably trade republic. To justify their actions 
the more powerful states used the Roman legal precedent (even though that legal 
perception only recognised the existence of one nation) to assert the primacy of 
their own military-political aims over the commercial motives of other nations. In 
this way Galiani depicted the modern history of humankind, just like he had done 
in his first work Della moneta, as a difficult and constantly frustrated series of 
attempts of the mechanisms of commercial exchange to break free from ever-
backfiring abuses of political force.
At the same time, just like Hübner had accused trade republics of not being neutral, 
so Galiani saw the recent history of the controversies involving the United Provinces 
and Great Britain as an equally perverse product of the confusion about the rights 
of neutral states to trade with belligerents. Being neutral, Galiani explained, was the 
political equivalent of the normal exercise of any degree of “natural friendship” that 
had developed between people. Referring to the sympathy in the United Provinces 
for American Independence, Galiani called the Dutch “false neutrals”, whose “occult” 
ideas of “friendship” serve to “foment and support the rebels”.62 
In sum, Galiani argued that the perseverance of primitive customs of maritime 
warfare in the practice of privateering that was accepted and by and large defended 
in the works of Grotius, Bynkershoek and Vattel harmed all commercial states. 
Whereas land war had been civilised in the course of time, the opinions of natural 
lawyers and national courts on the law of the sea reflected ancient warlike passions, 
neglected the effects of commerce on the progress of humanity and left space to 
neutrals and belligerents alike for the abuse of maritime commerce.
Despite the fact that huge progress had been made within the history of 
mankind since the middle ages, further development, particularly the integration 
of commercial societies, from Galiani’s point of view, was blocked by the fact that 
international law and the treaty system had emerged not as independently as they 
should have from religious ideas, national ideologies and the primitive customs of 
maritime strife. For Galiani, the madness of the crusades – a recourse to ancient 
warlike virtues inspired by Christian ideas –was directly comparable to the forces 
that urged European rulers to turn to war against merchant republics, manipulate 
commercial treaties by means of force and allow privateers and pirates to disturb 
the trade carried on by smaller states whose increasing wealth triggered sentiments 
of jealousy and hate in rulers of territorial states.63
61 Galiani 1942, 353–363.
62 Galiani 1942, 290–292.
63 Galiani 1942, 353–363.
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If Galiani, to grasp the real problem of neutrality and trade, favoured the 
perspective of a historical outlook on maritime commerce and its customs over a 
general moral, legal and political analysis of human nature and its development, 
this did not mean he did not have any general theory of justice and natural law. 
From the outset Galiani was hugely critical of all natural lawyers before him, who 
he saw as essentially still followers of Grotius. Among those criticised were Vattel, 
Bynkershoek, the Cocceji brothers, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac and even Hübner (whose 
ideas Galiani felt were closest to his). Galiani argued that even those writers (Vattel 
and Hübner) who had genuinely attempted to curb the abuse of power politics in the 
realm of international trade had focused their basic idea of moral obligation too much 
on the principle of justice and neglected beneficence as a source for civilising the 
anarchical society of states. Galiani did not accuse these authors of Epicureanism 
or Hobbesianism; instead their well-meaning characters had predisposed them too 
much to the juridical chimera of a stable international order based on the principle 
of justice. After sketching the whole history of natural law thought since Grotius as a 
Kantian parade of ‘sorry comforters’, Galiani argued that rather than to concentrate 
on correcting Grotius’s theory of justice, it was necessary to rehabilitate the idea of 
beneficence – the equivalent of his early notion of morality through self-deceit – as 
the source of an international society of sovereign states.
To illustrate the imbalances that had developed in the discourse of natural law 
Galiani pointed to the fact that the idea of “contract” that natural lawyers so frequently 
used in their treatment of strict justice, properly considered, was originally a term that 
meant the same as “society”, so a natural form of relative friendship creating moral 
obligations, not a term that denoted the express declaration of political promises.64
Galiani’s purpose was to construct a natural law theory that conformed to the way 
human beings and states committed themselves to particular moral ends without 
presenting them as qualitatively at the same level as formal political declarations 
and instances of strict justice. In the opening chapters of Dei doveri dei principi 
neutrali (and recurrently throughout the book) Galiani defended the significance of 
the principles of beneficence and universal society and argued that people were 
naturally sociable. Yet, he was eager to distinguish his views from any kind of 
cosmopolitanism that stipulated that it was natural for people to have an equal 
amount of fellow-feeling, compassion and friendship for the whole of humankind. 
Being human was not the same as behaving in an unnaturally altruistic manner 
64 Galiani 1942, 236; on the same page the League of the Armed neutrality is mentioned for the 
first time and is presented not as a way to extend the rights of neutrals or dispute the validity and 
importance of strict justice itself, but as a political and moral claim that beneficence and friendship 
in the modern world translated into a precise idea of being truly neutral. The first Armed neutrality, 
Galiani wrote, came as unexpected “light from the skies.”
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like Don Quixote, so Galiani illustrated his point.65 Beneficence, as Galiani defined 
it, was a resultant natural love or friendship depending 1.] on the closeness to the 
person involved in a struggle (or a state involved in war), 2.] the degree to which the 
situation of the friend felt emotionally as meriting help and 3.] the extent to which 
any help offered would actually make a difference. 
If natural law theory, and the body of ideas about the rights of neutral states to 
trade in wartime in particular, were to be redeveloped along the lines he proposed, 
Galiani believed it would be possible to dispense with the many artificial and entirely 
meaningless technical distinctions that had crept into discussions of the principles 
of justice. It was because writers had failed to develop international politics along 
the right lines, Galiani bitterly joked, that the only Enlightenment that he could see 
as a result of the political thought of the age was caused by the “blazes of warfare” 
that coloured the skies over Europe at night.66
Thus, Galiani agreed in a sense with Vattel that the political problem of the 
European state system was not a strictly legal one. The problem was not, as Hübner 
may be taken to have argued, that there was a need for an international institution 
with coercive powers or a set of legal principles that forced states to comply with 
rules of strict justice. Yet, Galiani was also a great critic of Vattel’s legal-political 
vision that formally discharged states from performing duties that ensued from 
the principle of beneficence; Vattel’s natural law views were too close to Grotius’s 
ideas. Next to that, Vattel’s attempts to pin down the limits between good and bad 
luxury and determine where the perfection of human nature produced politically 
and commercially dysfunctional aims went against the grain of Galiani’s general 
approach. From Galiani’s point of view, Vattel’s thinking about the development and 
integration of commercial societies imposed a kind of preconceived teleological 
image of the progress of human nature onto the actual problem at hand.
In tune with his historical views, for Galiani the problem of the neutrality of 
trade from war had a rather simple solution. It would be sufficient if the discourse 
of natural law and the international treaty system and maritime customs were to be 
cleared from those residual elements that stemmed from the time when maritime 
commerce had been a confused mix of piracy, plunder and unregulated avarice. 
The question was simply how to erase the lasting impression that this history 
had made onto the development of European public law. Here Galiani presented 
as the League of Armed neutrality as having exactly that purpose. Catherine the 
Great’s initiative. Galiani believed, was not an anti-English ploy or an early stage 
of a plan to set up a supranational state (as in later times has sometimes been 
65 Galiani 1942, 38.
66 Galiani 1942, 241.
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supposed) but a carefully devised attempt to repair some of the most damaging 
historical construction errors in European international relations and public law. 
Armed Neutrality and International Commerce
What defined the League of Armed Neutrality, from Galiani’s perspective, was its 
spectacularly ambitious yet highly elegant attempt to impose an alternative logic of 
maritime commerce in wartime upon the existing inter-state system. Rather than 
simply extending the rights of neutrals, and limiting the rights of belligerents to 
disrupt trade, its aim was to realign trade and war by universalising the commercial 
treaty system and civilising naval warfare. Galiani, it seems, genuinely hoped that 
Catherine’s League of Armed Neutrality would eventually result in a new global 
political equilibrium in which small states like Naples could more easily preserve 
themselves. This interpretation would be in line with Galiani’s efforts since the 
1770s to reorganise Neapolitan foreign politics.
The trigger for Galiani to formulate his own theory of natural law, which was 
by itself a rejection of a great deal of that discourse, was Catherine the Great’s 
League of neutrality. Catherine’s project and its revival by Paul I in 1800 are now 
generally regarded as unsuccessful because they failed to protect the neutrality of 
its members – first in the outbreak of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784) and 
later in the wars of the Napoleonic aftermath of the French Revolution. The more 
interesting questions are how Armed neutrality was perceived at the time, from 
different perspectives, as a solution for a distinctive problem and how the history of 
global trade, war and Empire after the Vienna settlement connects with the problem 
of the neutrality of trade in the eighteenth-century state system. Comparing the 
rival perspectives of eighteenth-century political thinkers and officials like Hübner, 
Vattel and Galiani can serve as one of the initial steps towards regaining the 
authentic understanding that eighteenth-century observers had of the challenges 
and limits related to the integration of the supposedly inherently opposed political 




Adam, Ulrich 2006. The Political Economy of J.H.G. Justi. Oxford: Peter Lang.
------- 1998. Cornelius Van Bynkershoek: His Role in the History of International Law. The 
Hague-Boston: Kluwer.
Baudeau, Nicolas 1767. Review of Hübner’s Essai sur l’histoire du droit naturel, Ephémérides 
du citoyen 1767. Part I, 97–160; Part II, 113–192; Part III.
De Madariaga, Isabel 1963. Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality of 1780. London: 
Macmillan.
Diaz, Furio 1968. L’abate Galiani consigliere di commercio estero del Regno di Napoli. Rivista 
storica italiana, 80, 854–909.
Galiani, Ferdinando 1942. Dei doveri dei principi neutrali verso i principi guerreggianti, e di 
questo verso i neutrali, libri due. G.M. Monti (ed.). Bologna: Zanichelli.
------- 1958 (1770). Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds. Fausto Nicolini (ed.). 2 vols. Milan-
Naples: Ricciardi.
------- 1963 (1751). Della moneta e scritti inediti. Alberto Caracciolo & Alberto Merola (eds.). 
Milan: Feltrinelli. 
------- 1975. Opere. F. Diaz & L. Guerci (eds.), Illuministi Italiani. Vol. V. Milan-Naples: 
Ricciardi.
------- 1999. Scritti di politica economica. F. Cesarano (ed.). Lanciano: Rocco Carabba.
Helfman, Tara 2005. Neutrality, the Law of Nations, and the Natural Law Tradition: A Study of 
the Seven Years’ War. Yale Journal of International Law 30, 549–86.
Holland, Thomas Erskine 1921. Letters to “The Times” upon War and Neutrality (1881–1920), 
with some commentary (3rd edition). London: Longmans, Green and Company.
Hont, Istvan 2005. Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in 
Historical Perspective. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
------- 2006. Luxury and commerce. In The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political 
Thought. M. Goldie & R. Wokler (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
379–418.
Hübner, Martin [Jean-Henri Maubert de Gouvest] 1756 (2nd ed. 1759). Le politique danois, 
ou, L’ambition des Anglais démasquée par leurs pirateries: ouvrage dans lequel on 
recherche laquelle des deux nations de la France ou de l’Angleterre, a dérangé par ses 
hostilités l’harmonie de l’Europe, & où l’on prouve aux Souverains de quelle importance 
il est pour eux d’abattre l’orgueil de ce people. Copenhagen. 
------- 1757–8. Essai sur l’histoire du droit naturel. 2 vols. London.
------- 1759. Reflexions impartiales sur le droit des nations belligerantes de saisir les batimens 
neuters. Journal de commerce (November), 39–66.
------- 1759b. De la saisie des batimens neutres, ou Du Droit qu’ont les Nations Belligérantes 
d’arrêter les Navires des Peuples Amis Dedica a son excellence Monseigneur le baron 
de Bernstorff. 2 vols. The Hague.
------- 1778. Del sequestro de’ bastimenti neutrali ovvero: del diritto che hanno le nazioni 
belligeranti d’arrestare i bastimenti de’ popoli amici. Genoa.
Jouannet, Emmanuelle 1998. Emer de Vattel et l’émergence doctrinale du droit international 
classique. Paris: Pedone.
------- 2004. La critique de la pensée classique durant l’entre-deux guerres: Vattel et Van 
Vollenhoven. Miskolc Journal of International Law, 1, 45–63.
Universalism in International Law and Political Philosophy
89
Journal de commerce 1759. Review of Vattel’s Droit des gens (April & May), 137–169, 35–63.
Journal de commerce 1760. Review of Hübner’s De la saisie des batimens neutres (March, 
April & May), 89–126, 46–70, 53–76.
Kaplan, Steven Laurence 1976. Bread, Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV. 
2 vols. The Hague: M. Nijhoff. 
Longhitano, Gino (ed.) 1999. Marquis de Mirabeau & François Quesnay, Traité de la monarchie. 
Paris: Harmattan.
Nakhimovsky, Isaac 2007. Vattel’s theory of the international order: Commerce and the balance 
of power in the Law of Nations, History of European Ideas, 33, 157–173.
Rothkrug, Lionel 1965. Opposition to Louis XIV: The Political and Social Origins of the French 
Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sonenscher, Michael 2007. Before the Deluge: An Essay on the Intellectual Origins of the 
French Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
------- 2002. Physiocracy as a Theodicy. History of Political Thought 23, 326–339.
Stapelbroek, Koen 2007. Love, Self-Deceit and Money: Commerce and Morality in the Early 
Neapolitan Enlightenment. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Tuck, Richard 1999. The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International 
Order from Grotius to Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vattel, Emer de 1747. Le loisir philosophique ou Pièces diverses de philosophique, de morale 
et d’amusement. Genèva. 
------- 1757. Poliergie ou mélange de literature et de poësie. Par M. de V.*** Amsterdam.
------- 1762. Questions de droit naturel et observations sur le Traité du Droit de la nature du M. 
le Baron de Wolff par M. de Vattel. Bern.
------- 2008 (1758). The Law of Nations. Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore (ed. & intr.). 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Venturi, Franco 1960. Galiani tra enciclopedisti e fisiocrati. Rivista Storica Italiana 72, 45–64.
